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VAKA-2041 · 7 Oct 2026 · 6 alerts

Phishing-led credential theft and lateral movement

Severity
Critical
Verdict
True positive
Confidence
92%
Status
Awaiting human approval

At 09:12 an invoice email carrying a macro was delivered to Murat Kaya’s mailbox; 6 minutes later Word launched encoded PowerShell on QD-WS-114 and the device began beaconing to an external address. LSASS memory was then dumped, the svc_yedek account connected from this workstation to QD-SRV-FS01, and the server began connecting to the same external address. The six alerts were linked into a single attack story; because a critical server was reached, the response steps are awaiting human approval.

Flow

A1 · Invoice email with macro attachment delivered is selected. Click another alert, or Tab to it and press Enter; its details appear in the panel.

A1 Invoice email with macroattachment delivered09:12 · Initial Access A2 Word launchedencoded PowerShell09:18 · Execution A3 External beaconingevery 60 s09:19 · Command and Control A4 LSASS memory dumped09:41 · Credential Access A5 svc_yedek logon toFS01 admin share10:07 · Lateral Movement A6 FS01 connects to thesame external host10:24 · Command and Control
  • Continues on the same asset
  • Moves to another asset
  • Connection outside the company

An arrow means 'followed by', not 'caused'.

  • Critical
  • High
  • Medium
  • Low
  1. 09:12, A1: Invoice email with macro attachment delivered. Medium severity, Initial Access. Involved: Murat Kaya. Followed by A2, 6 min later (moves to another asset).
  2. 09:18, A2: Word launched encoded PowerShell. High severity, Execution. Involved: Murat Kaya, QD-WS-114. Followed by A3, 1 min later (connection outside the company). Followed by A4, 23 min later (continues on the same asset).
  3. 09:19, A3: External beaconing every 60 s. High severity, Command and Control. Involved: Murat Kaya, QD-WS-114.
  4. 09:41, A4: LSASS memory dumped. Critical severity, Credential Access. Involved: Murat Kaya, QD-WS-114. Followed by A5, 26 min later (moves to another asset).
  5. 10:07, A5: svc_yedek logon to FS01 admin share. Critical severity, Lateral Movement. Involved: QD-SRV-FS01, svc_yedek. Followed by A6, 17 min later (connection outside the company).
  6. 10:24, A6: FS01 connects to the same external host. Critical severity, Command and Control. Involved: QD-SRV-FS01.

A17 Oct 2026 09:12Mail gateway

Invoice email with macro attachment delivered

Medium severityInitial Access

A message from [email protected] with the attachment Fatura_Ekim.docm was delivered to Murat Kaya’s mailbox. The sender domain failed SPF validation.

Assets and people

  • PersonMurat KayaFinance Specialist · FinanceStandard account

Evidence records

  1. [E1]Mail gateway · message trace

    09:12:41 · MSG-20261007-0912-4471 · Sender [email protected] · Recipient [email protected] · Attachment Fatura_Ekim.docm (contains macros) · SPF: fail · Result: delivered

    Why it matters: The first record in the chain: an Office attachment carrying a macro was delivered from a sender that failed validation.

MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

Findings and evidence

  1. Finding 1

    The chain began with an invoice attachment carrying a macro: Fatura_Ekim.docm was delivered at 09:12 and opened at 09:17, and Word ran an encoded PowerShell command in a hidden window. Murat Kaya works in Finance and uses a standard account; PowerShell use is not part of his usual pattern.

    Evidence [E1][E2][E3]

  2. Finding 2

    From 09:19 onwards, QD-WS-114 opens HTTPS connections to cdn-guncelleme.invalid (198.51.100.23) every 60 seconds. The domain was seen for the first time company-wide in the last 90 days; the fixed interval points to automated command-and-control beaconing.

    Evidence [E4][E5]

  3. Finding 3

    At 09:41, an elevated process (integrity level High, SeDebugPrivilege enabled) spawned under the same PowerShell process dumped LSASS memory. This means the credentials of accounts signed in on the device may have been compromised. Because Murat Kaya’s account is a standard account, the case data does not show how privileges were escalated; this needs separate investigation.

    Evidence [E6]

  4. Finding 4

    At 10:07, the svc_yedek account connected from QD-WS-114 to the administrative share on QD-SRV-FS01. This account signs in only from QD-SRV-BK01; its use from a workstation is unusual. The session started 26 minutes after the LSASS dump, which is temporally consistent with credential theft. No record shows the account signing in on QD-WS-114.

    Evidence [E7][E8]

  5. Finding 5

    At 10:24, QD-SRV-FS01 began connecting to the address from A3 with the same certificate. The high-criticality server hosting the Finance share is communicating with the same infrastructure, which is why the impact is rated critical.

    Evidence [E9]

Evidence records

Evidence Source Record Why it matters
E1A1 Mail gateway · message trace 09:12:41 · MSG-20261007-0912-4471 · Sender [email protected] · Recipient [email protected] · Attachment Fatura_Ekim.docm (contains macros) · SPF: fail · Result: delivered The first record in the chain: an Office attachment carrying a macro was delivered from a sender that failed validation.
E2A2 EDR · file event 09:17:52 · QD-WS-114 · Fatura_Ekim.docm opened · C:\Users\murat.kaya\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\7QK2L9XM\Fatura_Ekim.docm · macros enabled The attachment was opened about 5 minutes after delivery, and the user enabled macros.
E3A2 EDR · process creation 09:18:07 · QD-WS-114 · WINWORD.EXE (PID 6412) → powershell.exe -NoP -W Hidden -Enc JABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAg… (PID 7288) · User QD\murat.kaya Word launching encoded PowerShell in a hidden window is a typical trace of macro-based execution; PowerShell use is not part of Murat Kaya’s usual pattern.
E4A3 DNS · query log 09:19:21 · 10.20.4.114 → A cdn-guncelleme.invalid → 198.51.100.23 · domain seen for the first time company-wide in the last 90 days No device in the company has queried this domain in the last 90 days.
E5A3 Proxy · TLS inspection 09:19:24 · 10.20.4.114 → CONNECT cdn-guncelleme.invalid:443 (198.51.100.23) · subsequent connections 09:20:24, 09:21:24, … interval 60 s (jitter < 1 s) · TLS inspection: server certificate self-signed, SHA-256 7be4…91a0 A fixed 60-second interval points to automated beaconing; human browsing is never this regular.
E6A4 EDR · process creation 09:41:18 · QD-WS-114 · powershell.exe (PID 7288) → rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 744 C:\Users\murat.kaya\AppData\Local\Temp\v.dmp full · target lsass.exe (PID 744) · Integrity level: High · SeDebugPrivilege enabled comsvcs.dll MiniDump is a known way to extract credentials from LSASS memory; the dump was started by the PowerShell process from A2. The process ran elevated although the account is a standard user; these records do not show how the elevation was obtained.
E7A5 DC · 4769 10:07:03 · QD-SRV-DC01 · Kerberos service ticket request · Account svc_yedek · Service cifs/QD-SRV-FS01 · Client 10.20.4.114 (QD-WS-114) The backup service account requested a ticket from a workstation instead of the backup server.
E8A5 FS01 · Windows Security 10:07:11 · Event 4624 (Logon Type 3) · QD\svc_yedek · Source 10.20.4.114 · 10:07:14 · Event 5140 · Share \\QD-SRV-FS01\C$ The session was opened on the server’s administrative share; the only usual sign-in source for svc_yedek is QD-SRV-BK01.
E9A6 NDR · flow record 10:24:31 · 10.20.1.10 (QD-SRV-FS01) → 198.51.100.23:443 · TLS · connections every 60 s · certificate SHA-256 7be4…91a0 (same as in E5) Same address, same interval and same certificate: the activity on FS01 goes to the same command-and-control infrastructure as the beaconing in A3.

Context

People

  • Murat Kaya

    Finance Specialist · Finance · Standard account

    Usual pattern Weekdays 08:30–18:00, works from the Ataşehir head office. Uses Excel, ERP and email. The account has no admin rights; PowerShell or command-line use is not part of the usual pattern.

Assets

  • QD-WS-114

    Workstation · Medium criticality · 10.20.4.114

    Finance workstation

    Owner: Murat Kaya

  • QD-SRV-FS01

    Server · High criticality · 10.20.1.10

    File server (Finance share \\QD-SRV-FS01\Finans)

    Owner: Ece Demir

  • svc_yedek

    Account · High criticality

    Backup service account (signs in only from QD-SRV-BK01)

    Owner: Ece Demir

Document excerpts behind the verdict

q-node retrieved these excerpts from the company’s own documents; each one supports a finding.

  • Institutional memoryInstitutional Memory: VAKA-1877

    An “invoice”-themed phishing attempt was blocked at the mail gateway at the time.

    Supports: Finding 1: the email theme matches VAKA-1877 in institutional memory

  • InventoryAsset Inventory

    QD-WS-114: Finance workstation. Owner: Murat Kaya. Criticality: medium. IP: 10.20.4.114.

    Supports: Findings 1–3: the first affected device is a Finance employee’s workstation

  • InventoryAsset Inventory

    svc_yedek: Backup service account (signs in only from QD-SRV-BK01). Owner: Ece Demir. Criticality: high.

    Supports: Finding 4: using the service account from a workstation is unusual

  • InventoryAsset Inventory

    QD-SRV-FS01: File server (Finance share \\QD-SRV-FS01\Finans). Owner: Ece Demir. Criticality: high. IP: 10.20.1.10.

    Supports: Finding 5 and severity: the high-criticality server hosts the Finance share

MITRE ATT&CK

  1. Recon­naissance not seen
  2. Resource Develop­ment not seen
  3. Initial Access 1 alert
  4. Execution 1 alert
  5. Persistence not seen
  6. Privilege Escalation not seen
  7. Stealth not seen
  8. Defense Impairment not seen
  9. Credential Access 1 alert
  10. Discovery not seen
  11. Lateral Movement 1 alert
  12. Collection not seen
  13. Command and Control 2 alerts
  14. Exfiltration not seen
  15. Impact not seen

Techniques

Technique Name Tactics Related alerts
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access A1
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File Execution A2
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell Execution A2
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Command and Control A3A6
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory Credential Access A4
T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement A5
T1078 Valid Accounts Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth A5

Actions

Approval gate: q-node recommends these actions; none is carried out without human approval. The controls are for illustration only.

  1. Isolate QD-WS-114 from the network

    Scope
    1 asset · internal workstation
    Privilege
    No privilege required
    Reversibility
    Reversible

    EDR network containment; the device stays reachable over the management channel and isolation is lifted in a single step. Murat Kaya cannot work from this device.

    Human approval required
  2. Block the domain cdn-guncelleme.invalid and the address 198.51.100.23

    Scope
    Proxy and firewall · 1 domain, 1 IP · company-wide
    Privilege
    No privilege required
    Reversibility
    Reversible

    The domain was seen for the first time company-wide in the last 90 days, so no impact on business traffic is expected. The block also cuts QD-SRV-FS01’s outbound connection.

    Human approval required
  3. Reset Murat Kaya’s password

    Scope
    1 account · standard user
    Privilege
    No privilege required
    Reversibility
    Irreversible

    The old password cannot be restored; open sessions are terminated. The new password is passed to the user over a secure channel.

    Human approval required
  4. Change the svc_yedek password

    Scope
    1 service account · backup jobs
    Privilege
    Privileged operation
    Reversibility
    Irreversible

    Privileged account: backup jobs on QD-SRV-BK01 may fail until the password is updated there. Timing should be confirmed separately with Ece Demir.

    Human approval required
  5. Restrict QD-SRV-FS01’s outbound traffic instead of isolating it

    Scope
    1 critical server · outbound only
    Privilege
    Privileged operation
    Reversibility
    Reversible

    The critical server has a large blast radius: full isolation would cut access to the Finance share. Restricting outbound traffic keeps the share available.

    Human approval required

Ask the Analyst

Coming soon

The live AI analyst (LLM connection) is coming to this tab soon. It will answer questions like these from the case data:

  • Why were these 6 alerts treated as a single attack?
  • Why does it matter that svc_yedek was used from a workstation?
  • Why do you recommend restricting QD-SRV-FS01’s outbound traffic instead of isolating it?
  • How is this case related to VAKA-1877?

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