VAKA-2041 · 7 Oct 2026 · 6 alerts
Phishing-led credential theft and lateral movement
- Severity
- Critical
- Verdict
- True positive
- Confidence
- 92%
- Status
- Awaiting human approval
At 09:12 an invoice email carrying a macro was delivered to Murat Kaya’s mailbox; 6 minutes later Word launched encoded PowerShell on QD-WS-114 and the device began beaconing to an external address. LSASS memory was then dumped, the svc_yedek account connected from this workstation to QD-SRV-FS01, and the server began connecting to the same external address. The six alerts were linked into a single attack story; because a critical server was reached, the response steps are awaiting human approval.
Flow
- Continues on the same asset
- Moves to another asset
- Connection outside the company
An arrow means 'followed by', not 'caused'.
- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Low
- 09:12, A1: Invoice email with macro attachment delivered. Medium severity, Initial Access. Involved: Murat Kaya. Followed by A2, 6 min later (moves to another asset).
- 09:18, A2: Word launched encoded PowerShell. High severity, Execution. Involved: Murat Kaya, QD-WS-114. Followed by A3, 1 min later (connection outside the company). Followed by A4, 23 min later (continues on the same asset).
- 09:19, A3: External beaconing every 60 s. High severity, Command and Control. Involved: Murat Kaya, QD-WS-114.
- 09:41, A4: LSASS memory dumped. Critical severity, Credential Access. Involved: Murat Kaya, QD-WS-114. Followed by A5, 26 min later (moves to another asset).
- 10:07, A5: svc_yedek logon to FS01 admin share. Critical severity, Lateral Movement. Involved: QD-SRV-FS01, svc_yedek. Followed by A6, 17 min later (connection outside the company).
- 10:24, A6: FS01 connects to the same external host. Critical severity, Command and Control. Involved: QD-SRV-FS01.
A17 Oct 2026 09:12Mail gateway
Invoice email with macro attachment delivered
A message from [email protected] with the attachment Fatura_Ekim.docm was delivered to Murat Kaya’s mailbox. The sender domain failed SPF validation.
Assets and people
- PersonMurat KayaFinance Specialist · Finance
Evidence records
[E1]Mail gateway · message trace
09:12:41 · MSG-20261007-0912-4471 · Sender [email protected] · Recipient [email protected] · Attachment Fatura_Ekim.docm (contains macros) · SPF: fail · Result: delivered
Why it matters: The first record in the chain: an Office attachment carrying a macro was delivered from a sender that failed validation.
MITRE ATT&CK
- T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
Findings and evidence
-
Finding 1
The chain began with an invoice attachment carrying a macro: Fatura_Ekim.docm was delivered at 09:12 and opened at 09:17, and Word ran an encoded PowerShell command in a hidden window. Murat Kaya works in Finance and uses a standard account; PowerShell use is not part of his usual pattern.
-
Finding 3
At 09:41, an elevated process (integrity level High, SeDebugPrivilege enabled) spawned under the same PowerShell process dumped LSASS memory. This means the credentials of accounts signed in on the device may have been compromised. Because Murat Kaya’s account is a standard account, the case data does not show how privileges were escalated; this needs separate investigation.
Evidence [E6]
-
Finding 4
At 10:07, the svc_yedek account connected from QD-WS-114 to the administrative share on QD-SRV-FS01. This account signs in only from QD-SRV-BK01; its use from a workstation is unusual. The session started 26 minutes after the LSASS dump, which is temporally consistent with credential theft. No record shows the account signing in on QD-WS-114.
-
Finding 5
At 10:24, QD-SRV-FS01 began connecting to the address from A3 with the same certificate. The high-criticality server hosting the Finance share is communicating with the same infrastructure, which is why the impact is rated critical.
Evidence [E9]
Evidence records
| Evidence | Source | Record | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1A1 | Mail gateway · message trace | 09:12:41 · MSG-20261007-0912-4471 · Sender [email protected] · Recipient [email protected] · Attachment Fatura_Ekim.docm (contains macros) · SPF: fail · Result: delivered | The first record in the chain: an Office attachment carrying a macro was delivered from a sender that failed validation. |
| E2A2 | EDR · file event | 09:17:52 · QD-WS-114 · Fatura_Ekim.docm opened · C:\Users\murat.kaya\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\7QK2L9XM\Fatura_Ekim.docm · macros enabled | The attachment was opened about 5 minutes after delivery, and the user enabled macros. |
| E3A2 | EDR · process creation | 09:18:07 · QD-WS-114 · WINWORD.EXE (PID 6412) → powershell.exe -NoP -W Hidden -Enc JABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAg… (PID 7288) · User QD\murat.kaya | Word launching encoded PowerShell in a hidden window is a typical trace of macro-based execution; PowerShell use is not part of Murat Kaya’s usual pattern. |
| E4A3 | DNS · query log | 09:19:21 · 10.20.4.114 → A cdn-guncelleme.invalid → 198.51.100.23 · domain seen for the first time company-wide in the last 90 days | No device in the company has queried this domain in the last 90 days. |
| E5A3 | Proxy · TLS inspection | 09:19:24 · 10.20.4.114 → CONNECT cdn-guncelleme.invalid:443 (198.51.100.23) · subsequent connections 09:20:24, 09:21:24, … interval 60 s (jitter < 1 s) · TLS inspection: server certificate self-signed, SHA-256 7be4…91a0 | A fixed 60-second interval points to automated beaconing; human browsing is never this regular. |
| E6A4 | EDR · process creation | 09:41:18 · QD-WS-114 · powershell.exe (PID 7288) → rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 744 C:\Users\murat.kaya\AppData\Local\Temp\v.dmp full · target lsass.exe (PID 744) · Integrity level: High · SeDebugPrivilege enabled | comsvcs.dll MiniDump is a known way to extract credentials from LSASS memory; the dump was started by the PowerShell process from A2. The process ran elevated although the account is a standard user; these records do not show how the elevation was obtained. |
| E7A5 | DC · 4769 | 10:07:03 · QD-SRV-DC01 · Kerberos service ticket request · Account svc_yedek · Service cifs/QD-SRV-FS01 · Client 10.20.4.114 (QD-WS-114) | The backup service account requested a ticket from a workstation instead of the backup server. |
| E8A5 | FS01 · Windows Security | 10:07:11 · Event 4624 (Logon Type 3) · QD\svc_yedek · Source 10.20.4.114 · 10:07:14 · Event 5140 · Share \\QD-SRV-FS01\C$ | The session was opened on the server’s administrative share; the only usual sign-in source for svc_yedek is QD-SRV-BK01. |
| E9A6 | NDR · flow record | 10:24:31 · 10.20.1.10 (QD-SRV-FS01) → 198.51.100.23:443 · TLS · connections every 60 s · certificate SHA-256 7be4…91a0 (same as in E5) | Same address, same interval and same certificate: the activity on FS01 goes to the same command-and-control infrastructure as the beaconing in A3. |
Context
People
-
Murat Kaya
Finance Specialist · Finance · Standard account
Usual pattern Weekdays 08:30–18:00, works from the Ataşehir head office. Uses Excel, ERP and email. The account has no admin rights; PowerShell or command-line use is not part of the usual pattern.
Assets
-
QD-WS-114
Workstation · Medium criticality · 10.20.4.114
Finance workstation
Owner: Murat Kaya
-
QD-SRV-FS01
Server · High criticality · 10.20.1.10
File server (Finance share \\QD-SRV-FS01\Finans)
Owner: Ece Demir
-
svc_yedek
Account · High criticality
Backup service account (signs in only from QD-SRV-BK01)
Owner: Ece Demir
Document excerpts behind the verdict
q-node retrieved these excerpts from the company’s own documents; each one supports a finding.
-
Institutional memoryInstitutional Memory: VAKA-1877
An “invoice”-themed phishing attempt was blocked at the mail gateway at the time.
Supports: Finding 1: the email theme matches VAKA-1877 in institutional memory
-
InventoryAsset Inventory
QD-WS-114: Finance workstation. Owner: Murat Kaya. Criticality: medium. IP: 10.20.4.114.
Supports: Findings 1–3: the first affected device is a Finance employee’s workstation
-
InventoryAsset Inventory
svc_yedek: Backup service account (signs in only from QD-SRV-BK01). Owner: Ece Demir. Criticality: high.
Supports: Finding 4: using the service account from a workstation is unusual
-
InventoryAsset Inventory
QD-SRV-FS01: File server (Finance share \\QD-SRV-FS01\Finans). Owner: Ece Demir. Criticality: high. IP: 10.20.1.10.
Supports: Finding 5 and severity: the high-criticality server hosts the Finance share
MITRE ATT&CK
- Reconnaissance not seen
- Resource Development not seen
- Initial Access 1 alert
- Execution 1 alert
- Persistence not seen
- Privilege Escalation not seen
- Stealth not seen
- Defense Impairment not seen
- Credential Access 1 alert
- Discovery not seen
- Lateral Movement 1 alert
- Collection not seen
- Command and Control 2 alerts
- Exfiltration not seen
- Impact not seen
Techniques
| Technique | Name | Tactics | Related alerts |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access | A1 |
| T1204.002 | User Execution: Malicious File | Execution | A2 |
| T1059.001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | Execution | A2 |
| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | A3A6 |
| T1003.001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | Credential Access | A4 |
| T1021.002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement | A5 |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth | A5 |
Actions
Approval gate: q-node recommends these actions; none is carried out without human approval. The controls are for illustration only.
-
Isolate QD-WS-114 from the network
- Scope
- 1 asset · internal workstation
- Privilege
- No privilege required
- Reversibility
- Reversible
EDR network containment; the device stays reachable over the management channel and isolation is lifted in a single step. Murat Kaya cannot work from this device.
Human approval required -
Block the domain cdn-guncelleme.invalid and the address 198.51.100.23
- Scope
- Proxy and firewall · 1 domain, 1 IP · company-wide
- Privilege
- No privilege required
- Reversibility
- Reversible
The domain was seen for the first time company-wide in the last 90 days, so no impact on business traffic is expected. The block also cuts QD-SRV-FS01’s outbound connection.
Human approval required -
Reset Murat Kaya’s password
- Scope
- 1 account · standard user
- Privilege
- No privilege required
- Reversibility
- Irreversible
The old password cannot be restored; open sessions are terminated. The new password is passed to the user over a secure channel.
Human approval required -
Change the svc_yedek password
- Scope
- 1 service account · backup jobs
- Privilege
- Privileged operation
- Reversibility
- Irreversible
Privileged account: backup jobs on QD-SRV-BK01 may fail until the password is updated there. Timing should be confirmed separately with Ece Demir.
Human approval required -
Restrict QD-SRV-FS01’s outbound traffic instead of isolating it
- Scope
- 1 critical server · outbound only
- Privilege
- Privileged operation
- Reversibility
- Reversible
The critical server has a large blast radius: full isolation would cut access to the Finance share. Restricting outbound traffic keeps the share available.
Human approval required
Ask the Analyst
Coming soon
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- Why were these 6 alerts treated as a single attack?
- Why does it matter that svc_yedek was used from a workstation?
- Why do you recommend restricting QD-SRV-FS01’s outbound traffic instead of isolating it?
- How is this case related to VAKA-1877?
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