VAKA-2047 · 7 Oct 2026 · 3 alerts
VPN password spraying, one account compromised
- Severity
- High
- Verdict
- True positive
- Confidence
- 90%
- Status
- Awaiting human approval
Between 03:10 and 03:42, the address 203.0.113.77 made 412 failed sign-in attempts against 40 accounts on QD-VPN01. At 03:44, the same address signed in successfully with the kerem.ozturk account, one of the accounts tried and whose owner is on annual leave, through the legacy VPN profile that has an MFA exception. 14 minutes later, domain accounts were queried from the same session.
Flow
- Continues on the same asset
- Moves to another asset
- Connection outside the company
An arrow means 'followed by', not 'caused'.
- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Low
- 03:10–03:42, C1: 412 failed logins across 40 accounts. Medium severity, Credential Access. Involved: QD-VPN01. Followed by C2, 2 min later (continues on the same asset).
- 03:44, C2: kerem.ozturk signed in via legacy profile (no MFA). High severity, Initial Access. Involved: Kerem Öztürk, QD-VPN01. Followed by C3, 14 min later (moves to another asset).
- 03:58, C3: Domain accounts enumerated via LDAP. High severity, Discovery. Involved: Kerem Öztürk, QD-SRV-DC01.
C17 Oct 2026 03:10–03:42VPN
412 failed logins across 40 accounts
External target203.0.113.77
Over 32 minutes, the address 203.0.113.77 made a total of 412 failed sign-in attempts against 40 different accounts on QD-VPN01. Because the attempts were spread across accounts, the lockout threshold was never reached.
Assets and people
- Network gatewayQD-VPN01VPN gateway
Evidence records
[E1]VPN · authentication log
03:10:04–03:42:51 · QD-VPN01 · Source 203.0.113.77 · 40 distinct usernames (including kerem.ozturk) · 412 failed (AUTH_FAIL) · on average 10, at most 12 attempts per account · Lockout threshold: 15 failed attempts / 30 min · no account lockouts
Why it matters: Attempts from a single address spread across many accounts are the password-spraying pattern; attempts per account stayed below the lockout threshold (15 / 30 min).
MITRE ATT&CK
- T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying
Findings and evidence
-
Finding 1
Between 03:10 and 03:42, a single external address (203.0.113.77) made 412 failed sign-in attempts against 40 accounts on QD-VPN01. Because the attempts were spread across accounts, no lockout was triggered; this is a password-spraying pattern.
Evidence [E1]
-
Finding 4
The legacy VPN profile was open because of the temporary MFA exception in the policy (until 31 Oct 2026), so the password alone was enough to sign in. Since the account was among those tried in the spraying, the password was probably obtained that way; no record in this case directly shows how it was obtained.
-
Finding 5
14 minutes later, the same session queried domain accounts over LDAP. No activity beyond the discovery stage is recorded in this case.
Evidence [E4]
Evidence records
| Evidence | Source | Record | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1C1 | VPN · authentication log | 03:10:04–03:42:51 · QD-VPN01 · Source 203.0.113.77 · 40 distinct usernames (including kerem.ozturk) · 412 failed (AUTH_FAIL) · on average 10, at most 12 attempts per account · Lockout threshold: 15 failed attempts / 30 min · no account lockouts | Attempts from a single address spread across many accounts are the password-spraying pattern; attempts per account stayed below the lockout threshold (15 / 30 min). |
| E2C2 | VPN · sign-in | 03:44:19 · QD-VPN01 · User kerem.ozturk · Profile SATIS-ESKI · MFA: not applied · Source 203.0.113.77 · Assigned address 10.20.9.45 | The first successful sign-in from the same address as the spraying in E1; MFA was not requested. |
| E3C2 | VPN · sign-in history | 03:44:19 · kerem.ozturk · every sign-in in the previous 30 days was on weekdays between 08:30 and 18:30 and originated from Istanbul · this sign-in at 03:44, originating outside Istanbul | The time and location deviate from the user’s usual working pattern. |
| E4C3 | DC · LDAP query log | 03:58:36 · QD-SRV-DC01 · Client 10.20.9.45 · Account QD\kerem.ozturk · (objectClass=user) and (objectClass=group) · paged query, 1,874 objects returned | A sales user listing the entire domain is not normal; this is discovery behaviour. |
Context
People
-
Kerem Öztürk
Sales Manager · Sales · Standard account
Usual pattern Weekdays 08:30–18:30, usually works from Istanbul. VPN sign-ins are during office hours and originate from Istanbul.
Assets
-
QD-VPN01
Network gateway · High criticality · 10.20.0.2
VPN gateway
Owner: Burak Şahin
-
QD-SRV-DC01
Server · High criticality · 10.20.1.5
Domain controller
Owner: Ece Demir
Document excerpts behind the verdict
q-node retrieved these excerpts from the company’s own documents; each one supports a finding.
-
HR recordHR Leave and Departures List
Kerem Öztürk is on annual leave: 5 Oct 2026 – 16 Oct 2026.
Supports: Finding 3: the account owner is on leave, no sign-in is expected
-
PolicyVPN Access Policy
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is mandatory. The Sales team’s legacy VPN profile is a temporary exception until 31 Oct 2026.
Supports: Finding 4: MFA is bypassed only on the legacy Sales profile
-
InventoryAsset Inventory
QD-VPN01: VPN gateway. Owner: Burak Şahin. Criticality: high. IP: 10.20.0.2.
Supports: Findings 1 and 2: the target of the attack is a high-criticality gateway
-
InventoryAsset Inventory
QD-SRV-DC01: Domain controller. Owner: Ece Demir. Criticality: high. IP: 10.20.1.5.
Supports: Finding 5: discovery turned to the identity infrastructure
MITRE ATT&CK
- Reconnaissance not seen
- Resource Development not seen
- Initial Access 1 alert
- Execution not seen
- Persistence not seen
- Privilege Escalation not seen
- Stealth not seen
- Defense Impairment not seen
- Credential Access 1 alert
- Discovery 1 alert
- Lateral Movement not seen
- Collection not seen
- Command and Control not seen
- Exfiltration not seen
- Impact not seen
Techniques
| Technique | Name | Tactics | Related alerts |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1110.003 | Brute Force: Password Spraying | Credential Access | C1 |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth | C2 |
| T1133 | External Remote Services | Initial Access, Persistence | C2 |
| T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account | Discovery | C3 |
Actions
Approval gate: q-node recommends these actions; none is carried out without human approval. The controls are for illustration only.
-
End the VPN session and temporarily lock the account
- Scope
- 1 account · 1 active session
- Privilege
- No privilege required
- Reversibility
- Reversible
IT unlocks the account after verifying the user’s identity. The user is on annual leave, so the business impact is low.
Human approval required -
Block 203.0.113.77 on the VPN gateway
- Scope
- 1 IP · QD-VPN01
- Privilege
- No privilege required
- Reversibility
- Reversible
Covers a single external address; the attacker can switch addresses, so this is not enough on its own.
Human approval required -
Enforce MFA on the legacy Sales VPN profile
- Scope
- VPN profile · entire Sales team
- Privilege
- Privileged operation
- Reversibility
- Reversible
Affects the whole Sales team; users without MFA enrolment will not be able to connect. A user announcement is recommended first. The temporary exception already ends on 31 Oct 2026.
Human approval required -
Reset Kerem Öztürk’s password
- Scope
- 1 account · standard user
- Privilege
- No privilege required
- Reversibility
- Irreversible
The password may have been obtained through the spraying. The old password cannot be restored; the new one is passed to the user over a secure channel when he returns from leave.
Human approval required
Ask the Analyst
Coming soon
The live AI analyst (LLM connection) is coming to this tab soon. It will answer questions like these from the case data:
- Why was this sign-in assessed as a compromised account?
- What role did the MFA exception on the legacy VPN profile play?
- How was the password spraying detected?
- How would locking the account affect Kerem Öztürk?
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