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VAKA-2047 · 7 Oct 2026 · 3 alerts

VPN password spraying, one account compromised

Severity
High
Verdict
True positive
Confidence
90%
Status
Awaiting human approval

Between 03:10 and 03:42, the address 203.0.113.77 made 412 failed sign-in attempts against 40 accounts on QD-VPN01. At 03:44, the same address signed in successfully with the kerem.ozturk account, one of the accounts tried and whose owner is on annual leave, through the legacy VPN profile that has an MFA exception. 14 minutes later, domain accounts were queried from the same session.

Flow

C1 · 412 failed logins across 40 accounts is selected. Click another alert, or Tab to it and press Enter; its details appear in the panel.

C1 412 failed loginsacross 40 accounts03:10–03:42 · Credential Access C2 kerem.ozturk signed in vialegacy profile (no MFA)03:44 · Initial Access C3 Domain accountsenumerated via LDAP03:58 · Discovery
  • Continues on the same asset
  • Moves to another asset
  • Connection outside the company

An arrow means 'followed by', not 'caused'.

  • Critical
  • High
  • Medium
  • Low
  1. 03:10–03:42, C1: 412 failed logins across 40 accounts. Medium severity, Credential Access. Involved: QD-VPN01. Followed by C2, 2 min later (continues on the same asset).
  2. 03:44, C2: kerem.ozturk signed in via legacy profile (no MFA). High severity, Initial Access. Involved: Kerem Öztürk, QD-VPN01. Followed by C3, 14 min later (moves to another asset).
  3. 03:58, C3: Domain accounts enumerated via LDAP. High severity, Discovery. Involved: Kerem Öztürk, QD-SRV-DC01.

C17 Oct 2026 03:10–03:42VPN

412 failed logins across 40 accounts

Medium severityCredential Access

External target203.0.113.77

Over 32 minutes, the address 203.0.113.77 made a total of 412 failed sign-in attempts against 40 different accounts on QD-VPN01. Because the attempts were spread across accounts, the lockout threshold was never reached.

Assets and people

  • Network gatewayQD-VPN01VPN gatewayHigh criticality · 10.20.0.2 · Owner: Burak Şahin

Evidence records

  1. [E1]VPN · authentication log

    03:10:04–03:42:51 · QD-VPN01 · Source 203.0.113.77 · 40 distinct usernames (including kerem.ozturk) · 412 failed (AUTH_FAIL) · on average 10, at most 12 attempts per account · Lockout threshold: 15 failed attempts / 30 min · no account lockouts

    Why it matters: Attempts from a single address spread across many accounts are the password-spraying pattern; attempts per account stayed below the lockout threshold (15 / 30 min).

MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1110.003Brute Force: Password SprayingCredential Access

Findings and evidence

  1. Finding 1

    Between 03:10 and 03:42, a single external address (203.0.113.77) made 412 failed sign-in attempts against 40 accounts on QD-VPN01. Because the attempts were spread across accounts, no lockout was triggered; this is a password-spraying pattern.

    Evidence [E1]

  2. Finding 2

    The successful sign-in came from the same address as the spraying: at 03:44 the kerem.ozturk account signed in through the legacy VPN profile, where MFA is not requested. kerem.ozturk was one of the 40 accounts tried in the spraying.

    Evidence [E1][E2]

  3. Finding 3

    According to the HR record, Kerem Öztürk is on annual leave from 5 to 16 Oct 2026. The time (03:44) and location of the sign-in also differ from his usual pattern (office hours, from Istanbul).

    Evidence [E2][E3]

  4. Finding 4

    The legacy VPN profile was open because of the temporary MFA exception in the policy (until 31 Oct 2026), so the password alone was enough to sign in. Since the account was among those tried in the spraying, the password was probably obtained that way; no record in this case directly shows how it was obtained.

    Evidence [E1][E2]

  5. Finding 5

    14 minutes later, the same session queried domain accounts over LDAP. No activity beyond the discovery stage is recorded in this case.

    Evidence [E4]

Evidence records

Evidence Source Record Why it matters
E1C1 VPN · authentication log 03:10:04–03:42:51 · QD-VPN01 · Source 203.0.113.77 · 40 distinct usernames (including kerem.ozturk) · 412 failed (AUTH_FAIL) · on average 10, at most 12 attempts per account · Lockout threshold: 15 failed attempts / 30 min · no account lockouts Attempts from a single address spread across many accounts are the password-spraying pattern; attempts per account stayed below the lockout threshold (15 / 30 min).
E2C2 VPN · sign-in 03:44:19 · QD-VPN01 · User kerem.ozturk · Profile SATIS-ESKI · MFA: not applied · Source 203.0.113.77 · Assigned address 10.20.9.45 The first successful sign-in from the same address as the spraying in E1; MFA was not requested.
E3C2 VPN · sign-in history 03:44:19 · kerem.ozturk · every sign-in in the previous 30 days was on weekdays between 08:30 and 18:30 and originated from Istanbul · this sign-in at 03:44, originating outside Istanbul The time and location deviate from the user’s usual working pattern.
E4C3 DC · LDAP query log 03:58:36 · QD-SRV-DC01 · Client 10.20.9.45 · Account QD\kerem.ozturk · (objectClass=user) and (objectClass=group) · paged query, 1,874 objects returned A sales user listing the entire domain is not normal; this is discovery behaviour.

Context

People

  • Kerem Öztürk

    Sales Manager · Sales · Standard account

    Usual pattern Weekdays 08:30–18:30, usually works from Istanbul. VPN sign-ins are during office hours and originate from Istanbul.

Assets

  • QD-VPN01

    Network gateway · High criticality · 10.20.0.2

    VPN gateway

    Owner: Burak Şahin

  • QD-SRV-DC01

    Server · High criticality · 10.20.1.5

    Domain controller

    Owner: Ece Demir

Document excerpts behind the verdict

q-node retrieved these excerpts from the company’s own documents; each one supports a finding.

  • HR recordHR Leave and Departures List

    Kerem Öztürk is on annual leave: 5 Oct 2026 – 16 Oct 2026.

    Supports: Finding 3: the account owner is on leave, no sign-in is expected

  • PolicyVPN Access Policy

    Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is mandatory. The Sales team’s legacy VPN profile is a temporary exception until 31 Oct 2026.

    Supports: Finding 4: MFA is bypassed only on the legacy Sales profile

  • InventoryAsset Inventory

    QD-VPN01: VPN gateway. Owner: Burak Şahin. Criticality: high. IP: 10.20.0.2.

    Supports: Findings 1 and 2: the target of the attack is a high-criticality gateway

  • InventoryAsset Inventory

    QD-SRV-DC01: Domain controller. Owner: Ece Demir. Criticality: high. IP: 10.20.1.5.

    Supports: Finding 5: discovery turned to the identity infrastructure

MITRE ATT&CK

  1. Recon­naissance not seen
  2. Resource Develop­ment not seen
  3. Initial Access 1 alert
  4. Execution not seen
  5. Persistence not seen
  6. Privilege Escalation not seen
  7. Stealth not seen
  8. Defense Impairment not seen
  9. Credential Access 1 alert
  10. Discovery 1 alert
  11. Lateral Movement not seen
  12. Collection not seen
  13. Command and Control not seen
  14. Exfiltration not seen
  15. Impact not seen

Techniques

Technique Name Tactics Related alerts
T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying Credential Access C1
T1078 Valid Accounts Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth C2
T1133 External Remote Services Initial Access, Persistence C2
T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account Discovery C3

Actions

Approval gate: q-node recommends these actions; none is carried out without human approval. The controls are for illustration only.

  1. End the VPN session and temporarily lock the account

    Scope
    1 account · 1 active session
    Privilege
    No privilege required
    Reversibility
    Reversible

    IT unlocks the account after verifying the user’s identity. The user is on annual leave, so the business impact is low.

    Human approval required
  2. Block 203.0.113.77 on the VPN gateway

    Scope
    1 IP · QD-VPN01
    Privilege
    No privilege required
    Reversibility
    Reversible

    Covers a single external address; the attacker can switch addresses, so this is not enough on its own.

    Human approval required
  3. Enforce MFA on the legacy Sales VPN profile

    Scope
    VPN profile · entire Sales team
    Privilege
    Privileged operation
    Reversibility
    Reversible

    Affects the whole Sales team; users without MFA enrolment will not be able to connect. A user announcement is recommended first. The temporary exception already ends on 31 Oct 2026.

    Human approval required
  4. Reset Kerem Öztürk’s password

    Scope
    1 account · standard user
    Privilege
    No privilege required
    Reversibility
    Irreversible

    The password may have been obtained through the spraying. The old password cannot be restored; the new one is passed to the user over a secure channel when he returns from leave.

    Human approval required

Ask the Analyst

Coming soon

The live AI analyst (LLM connection) is coming to this tab soon. It will answer questions like these from the case data:

  • Why was this sign-in assessed as a compromised account?
  • What role did the MFA exception on the legacy VPN profile play?
  • How was the password spraying detected?
  • How would locking the account affect Kerem Öztürk?

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